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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a declaratory judgment proceeding commenced by
the natural father of a child born out of wedlock to determine
his rights in relation to said child.

The father sought a

determination first, that his consent, absent a judicial
termination of his parental rights, is an essential prerequisite to any adoption of the child, and second, that the
mother had released all her rights in relation to the child,
and that he was therefore entitled to custody of the child.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On November 11, 1974 the Fourth Judicial District Court
of the State of Utah, in and for Utah County, Allen B. Sorensen,
presiding, issued a Temporary Restraining Order and Order to
Show Cause restraining the Appellants from going forward with
any adoption proceeding involving said child.

On November 15,

1974 the Court issued a preliminary injunction requiring that
all adoption proceedings involving said child abate and remain
in a status quo position pending determination of Respondent's
rights in relation to said child.

On December 19, 1974, the

-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2matter came on for trial.

After a conference in chambers with

counsel, the Court bifurcated the issues, and an evidentiary
hearing proceeded on the sole issue of whether or not the Respondent
as the natural father, has rights in relation to the child such
that his consent is required for an adoption, absent proper proceedings to terminate any such rights.

The Court reserved all

issues with regard to custody for hearing at a later date.
The Court determined that the Respondent is the natural
father of the child, that he has publicly acknowledged the child,
and that he has rights in relation to said child within the
meaning and purview of §78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, as amended
(1973 Supp.)> and, unless his parental rights are terminated
as provided by law, his consent to the adoption of said child
is required.
The Court permanently enjoined the Appellants, and each
of them, from proceeding in any way with the adoption of the
child without the prior written consent of the Respondent.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellants seek reversal of the trial court's
Judgment, issued January 9, 1975, in which they were permanently
enjoined from proceeding in any way with the adoption of baby
girl H •_ _ _ without the prior consent of the Respondent.
The Respondent seeks affirmance.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-3STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent, TAAMU MELEISEA, and Appellant, JANA
HOPE, are the natural parents of baby girl H
October 25, 1974 in Salt Lake City, Utah. (Tr. 21)
was conceived and born out of wedlock.

, born
Said child

At the time of the

baby's birth the Respondent was in the process of obtaining a
divorce from his wife. (Tr. 17)

The Appellant JANA HOPE is

a single woman.
When the Respondent was informed by the Appellant JANA HOPE
of the pregnancy he readily acknowledged his paternity and made
an offer to either marry the Appellant after his divorce
became final or, at her option, to provide support for the
child. (Tr. 17) Appellant JANA HOPE refused to marry the
Respondent upon his divorce becoming final, but did accept
some nominal financial assistance from the Plaintiff during
her pregnancy. (Tr. 17, 53, 54)
In approximately April, 1974, (prior to the birth of
the child), Appellant JANA HOPE contacted Appellant L.D.S.
SOCIAL SERVICES for the purpose of placing the child with that
agency for adoption.

Once Appellant JANA HOPE had been

accepted as a client of the agency she adopted an assumed name
for the purpose of avoiding unnecessary notoriety regarding
the pregnancy. (Tr. 33)

Knowledge of her whereabouts during

the pregnancy was kept from the Respondent. (Tr. 41)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-4Shortly before the baby was born, Appellant L.D.S.
SOCIAL SERVICES sent the Respondent a letter indicating that
Appellant JANA HOPE had alleged his paternity of the expected child and requested that he contact their office if he
had any interest in the child. (Tr. 18, Rec, 34, Plaintiff's
Exhibit No. 2)
Immediately upon receipt of said letter, the Respondent
made an appointment with and went to the office of Ramona
Rasmussen, an agent of Appellant L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES assigned
as a case worker for Appellant JANA HOPE and baby girl H
Said meeting occurred on or about October 16, 1974.
19, 36)

.

(Tr. 18,

At said meeting Respondent readily acknowledged

his paternity of the child. (Tr. 19, 36)

The Respondent ex-

pressed an interest in obtaining custody of the child. (Tr. 19)
When informed of the mother's request that the child be placed
with a family for adoption, the Respondent informed Mrs.
Rasmussen that his married sister and brother-in-law would
like to adopt the child. (Tr. 19, 20, 43, 44)

Respondent was

informed by the SOCIAL SERVICES that neither he nor his relatives
could be considered as prospective adoptive parents, but that
he had a right to a court hearing prior to any such adoption.
(Tr, 20, 43)

The SOCIAL SERVICES then requested Respondent to

sign a written consent to adoption form.

The Respondent refused

and claimed rights in the child and informed the SOCIAL SERVICES
that he intended to seek legal advice regarding his rights.
(Tr, 20)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-5Shortly thereafter and before the baby was born, the
Respondent contacted legal counsel, who, in turn, contacted
Appellant L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES and informed that agency
that the Respondent, as the natural father of the expected
child, claimed rights in relation to said child and that the
Respondent would seek judicial enforcement of those rights
if adoption proceedings were commenced without his prior
consent (Tr. 39)
Three days after the birth of baby girl H

, on

October 28, 1974, Appellant JANA HOPE executed a written consent to adoption form and thereby placed the child for adoption
with Appellant L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3)
On October 31, 1974, Appellant L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES,
by and through Mrs. Rasmussen, again had contact with the
Respondent relative to the possible adoption of the child. (Tr.
20, 21) At this meeting Respondent again expressed an interest
in the child and requested custody of the child. (Tr. 47, 48)
The Respondent offered to pay the medical bills occasioned by
the pregnancy and birth and requested information as to the
condition and whereabouts of the child. (Tr. 22)

The Appellant

L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES refused his request for custody and
refused to disclose the whereabouts of the child. (Tr. 22, 41)
The Respondent again requested that his. sister and brother-in-law
be considered as prospective adoptive parents but L.D.S. SOCIAL
SERVICES informed him that that was against their policy.
(Tr. 48)

Respondent was again asked to execute a written form
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6consenting to placement of the child for adoption, but
Respondent refused to give his consent and claimed a right
to the child. (Tr. 23)
Baby girl H

_ has, since October 28, 1974, been in

the custody of Appellant L,DeSc SOCIAL SERVICES.

Despite

the knowledge on the part of Appellant L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES
of the natural fatherss claim to the child and both his avowed
intent to seek judicial determination of his rights, and their
promise to him that the issue would be decided in the courts,
said Appellant L.D.S, SOCIAL SERVICES placed the child with
prospective adoptive parents without the consent or knowledge
of the natural father.
On November 11, 1974 Respondent filed this declaratory
judgment proceeding seeking determination of his rights as
a natural parent in relation to baby girl H

t

under

§78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, as amended (1973 Supp.).
Respondent, in support of a Temporary Restraining Order in
this action, filed an Affidavit acknowledging his paternity
of the child and claiming rights in relation to said child.
(Rec, 34, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1)
The Fourth Judicial District Court of the State of Utah,
in and for Utah County, Allen B. Sorensen presiding, on
November 11, 1974 issued a Temporary Restraining Order and
Order to Show Cause restraining the Defendants from going
forward with any adoption proceeding involving baby girl
H

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-7On November 15, 1974 the Court issued a preliminary
injunction requiring that all adoption proceedings involving
baby girl H _

abate and remain in a status quo position

pending determination of Respondents rights in relation to
said childc (Rec. 17)
\ The matter came on for trial on December 19, 1974. After
a conference in chambers, the Court bifurcated the issues,
and proceeded with an evidentiary hearing on the sole issue
of whether or not Respondent, as the natural father, has
rights in relation to the child such that his consent is required for an adoption, absent proper proceedings to terminate
any such rights.

The Court reserved all issues with regard

to custody for hearing at a later date.
In a memorandum decision dated January 2, 1975, the Court
held that there was no dispute as to material facts, and that
the Respondent was entitled to the relief sought as a matter of
law, and entered judgment accordingly. (Rec. 15)
On January 9, 1975, the Court issued its findings, conclusions, and judgment, prepared by counsel for the Respondent.
(Rec. 23)

The Court determined that the Respondent is the

natural father of baby girl H

, that he has publicly

acknowledged the child as his own, and that he has rights in
relation to said child within the meaning and purview of
§78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, as amended (1973 Supp.).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The

-8Court further held that, unless the Respondent's parental
rights are terminated as provided by law, his consent to any
adoption of the child is required.

The Court therefore,

permanently enjoined the Appellants, and each of them,
from proceeding in any way with the adoption of the child
without the prior written consent of the Respondent, (Rec, 25)
POINT I
THE LAW NOW RECOGNIZES THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD AND ITS PUTATIVE
FATHER, AND UNDER RECENT U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
APPLYING THE RULE IN STANLEY v. ILLINOIS,

CONSENT TO

AN ADOPTION OF THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD MUST BE OBTAINED
FROM THE PUTATIVE FATHER, PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEES OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION.
At common law:

nullius

filius.

Traditionally, the legal

relationship between a natural father and his illegitimate
child reflected a callous indifference toward the rights of
the father.

Under the English common law of inheritance, an

illegitimate child was nullius

1,

filius

- "no man's son."

!T

Bastards are incapable of being heirs — Such
are held to be sons of nobody, nulius
filii,
and they have no inheritable blood. Hence, if
there be no other claimant than such illegitimate children, the land shall escheat to the
lord." BLACKSTONEfS COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW,
368 (B. Ganit, Ed., 1892).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-9Although the original English doctrine applied only to matters
involving inheritance, early American common law expanded it
into a complete disassociation of the natural father and his
child -- the child now belonged to "no man" for any and all
purposes.
Most American courts adopted the position that the
putative father had no legally cognizable connection with
his illegitimate child beyond the moral obligation to provide
support.

Some jurisdictions, however, went so far as to deny

the illegitimate child any right of support, recognition or
2
inheritance from the father.
This common law disinheritance
was eventually modified by statute in most jurisdictions,
however, and the original doctrine of nullius

filius

has

o

become extinct in this country.
Modern legal recognitition of the parent-child relationship.
Gradually, American law has begun to recognize a relationship
between the putative father and his illegitimate offspring.
Although the mother generally obtains custody of the child,
the natural father has been awarded rights of visitation,
even where the mother opposes the visits.

If the natural

2. In Re Lund's Estate, 26 Cal.2d 472, 480, 159 P.2d
643, 648 (1945).
3.

See,

e.g.,

§§74-4-10, 74-4-11, Utah Code Annotated.

4. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 56 Misc. 2d 711, 289 N.Y.S.2d
792 (Fam. Ct., Kings Co. 1968); Mixon v. Mize, 198 So. 2d 373
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Pennsylvania v. Rozanski, 206 Pa.
Super. 897, 213 A.2d 155 (1965); Strong v. Owens, 91 Cal. App.
336, 205 P.2d 48 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949); Ex parte Hendrix, 186
Okla. 712, 100 P.2d 444 (1940); Baker v. Baker, 81 N.J. Eq.
135, 85 A. 816 (Ch. 1913). See also Tabler, Paternal
Rights

in the Illegitimate

of the

Unwed Father,

Child:

Some Legitimate

Complaints

11 J. Fam. L. 231 (1971).
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on Behalf

-10mother died, or if she abandoned the child, the putative father
has been allowed standing to seek a judicial award of custody.
The father has also been given the power to legitimize and
adopt the child.
The illegitimate child itself has also begun to receive
judicial recognition.

The United States Supreme Court has

recently held unconstitutional a statute which deprived an
illegitimate child of the right to sue for the wrongful death
6
of its natural mother, as well as a statute which prohibited
the natural mother from maintaining an action for the wrongful
death of an illegitimate child.

In both cases, the Court

held that under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, illegitimate children cannot be treated differently
from those born in wedlock.
Adoption procedures prior to Stanley.

With regard to

the adoption of an illegitimate child, however, almost every
jurisdiction has traditionally refused to required the natural
father*s consent as a prerequisite.

In Utah, for example,

prior to amendment of the statute in 1966, the consent provision

5. See,
Annotated.

e.g.,

§§74-4-10, 77-60-14, 78-30-12, Utah Code

6. Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73,
20 L. Ed. 2d 441, 88 S. Ct. 1515 (1968).
7. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 20 L. Ed. 2d 436,
88 S. Ct. 1509 (1968).
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-118
omitted the putative father as a necessary consenting party.
Most similarly-worded statutes were construed to mean that the
9
natural mother's consent to the adoption was sufficient.
The
constitutionality of Utah's pre-1966 consent statute was
challenged in our Supreme Court in 1961. The Court upheld the
statute, recognizing and perpetuating what was then the majority
rule of law:
ff

The putative father of an illegitimate child
occupies no recognized paternal status at common
law or under our statutes. The law does not
recognize him at all, except that it will make
him pay for the child's maintenance if it can
find out who he is. The only father it recognizes
as having any rights is the father of a legitimate
child."10
Nevertheless, a few courts have begun to recognize that,
coexistent with the putative father's obligations

in relation

to the child, a natural unwed father has some rights

in re-

lation to his illegitimate child which cannot be totally

8. "A legitimate child cannot be adopted without the
consent of its parents, if living, nor an illegitimate child without the consent of its mother."
§78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated (1953).
9.

The Oregon statute, for example, specifically states

that:
"The consent of the mother of the [illegitimate]
child is sufficient . . . and for all purposes
relating to the adoption of the child the father
of the child shall be disregarded, just as if he
were dead." Ore. Rev. Code §109.326 (1969).
10. Thomas v. Children's Aid Society of Ogden, 12 Utah 2d
235, 364 P.2d 1029, 1031-32 (1961).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-12ignored.

To deny the sirehood and paternity of an illegitimate

child is to deny a biological fact and indulge in a fiction.
The biological bond exists regardless of whether or not the
11
law chooses to recognize it,
Stanley

v. Illinois.

A major turning point in the law

came in 1972, with the United States Supreme Court decision
12
in Stanley v. Illinois.
Although Stanley
did not specifically
involve an adoption proceeding, it has had a vitally important
impact on the status of putative fathers in hearings and proceedings regarding their illegitimate children.
Peter Stanley lived with Joan Stanley intermittently for
18 years, during which time they had three children, although
they never married. When Joan died, the three children were
declared wards of the state and placed with court-appointed
guardians. As an unwed father, Peter Stanley was not a "parent"
under Illinois statutes, and consequently was not entitled to
a hearing as to the children's dependency or his fitness as
a parent. Although Illinois lav; afforded such a hearing to
married fathers and mothers, and to unwed mothers, unwed fathers
such as Stanley were presumed unfit.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Illinois procedure of denying the putative father the same

11. One court has stated: n . . . certainly to the
illegitimate child, the father is never putative." Commonwealth
v, Rozanski, 206 Pa, Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155, 157 (1965).
12.

405 U.S. 645, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-13procedures and rights afforded married couples and unwed mothers
13
14
violated both the Due Process
and Equal Protection
clauses
of the U.S. Constitution.
Impact of Stanley

on adoption procedures. Although the

specific facts in Stanley

involved a custody proceeding, the

Court suggested that the rationale of the decision applied
15
equally to adoption proceedings.
Any doubt as to the

13.

"[The State of Illinois] insists on presuming rather
than proving Stanley's unfitness solely because it
is more convenient to presume than to prove. Under
the Due Process Clause, that advantage is insufficient
to justify refusing a father a hearing when the issue
at stake is the dismemberment of his family." 405 U.S.
at 658.

14.

"The State of Illinois assumes custody of the children
of married parents, divorced parents, and unmarried
mothers only after a hearing and proof of neglect.
The children of unmarried fathers, however, are declared dependent children without a hearing on parental
fitness and without proof of neglect. Stanley's claim
in the state courts and here is that failure to afford
him a hearing on his parental qualifications while
extending it to other parents denied him equal protection
of the laws. We have concluded that all Illinois parents
are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody.
It follows that denying such a hearing to Stanley and
those like him while granting it to other Illinois
parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection

Clause."
15.

Id.

"We note in passing that the incremental cost of offering
unwed fathers an opportunity for individualized hearings
on fitness appears to be minimal. If unwed fathers, in
the main, do not care about the disposition of their
children, they will not appear to demand hearing. If
they do care, under the scheme here held invalid,
Illinois would admittedly at some later time have to
afford them a properly focused hearing in a custody
or adoption proceeding."
(emphasis added) 405 U.S. at
657, n. 9.
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-Inapplicability of Stanley

to adoption proceedings was immedi-

ately dispelled when, only two weeks later, the Supreme
16
Court decided Eothstein

v. Lutheran

Social

Services.

In

that case, an illegitimate child had been placed with adoptive
parents within two weeks after its birth.

Although the

parental rights of the mother had been terminated through her
consent, the unwed father had not been notified of the adoption
proceedings, and had not given his consent to termination of
his parental rights.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to

recognize any parental rights in the unwed father, or the
necessity of obtaining his consent.

The Wisconsin high court

indicated that its decision was based on the reasoning of the
earlier Utah case, Thomas v.

Children9s

Aid

Society:

Because of the apparent similarity between the
Utah and the Wisconsin [adoption] statutes
and the different definitions in [sic] set forth
under statutes in other jurisdictions, we think
the reasoning of the Thomas Case can be applied
to the instant case,16a
Then, quoting directly from the Thomas case the rule laid
down by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Eothstein

incorporated

by this reference, the rule of the Thomas case;

16.
(1972).

405 U.S. 1051, 92 S. Ct. 1488, 31 L. Ed.. 2d 786

16a. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services,
47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56, 63 (1970).
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However, plaintiffs argue that if the statute
requires only the consent of the mother of an
illegitimate child, and not that of the father,
it is unconstitutional because fit authorizes
a private individual to deprive another individual
of his natural, statutory, and constitutional rights
without a hearing of any kind.f This poses the
question as to whether the rights of a father,
if any he has, to his illegitimate child come within
the purview of the due process clause and various
other provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions. We think not. The claim of the plaintiffs
is based upon the theory of a chattel ownership
of the child, but no such right is capable of
legal recognition. The putative father of an
illegitimate child occupies no recognized paternal
status at common law or under our statutes. The
law does not recognize him at all, except that
it will make him pay for the child's maintenance
if it can find out who he is. The only father it
recognizes as having any rights is the father of
a legitimate child.^-^b
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the case for further consideration in light of

Stanley.

It is important for purposes of the present proceeding to
note that in so ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court effectively
reversed the reasoning of the Utah court in Thomas v.

Aid

Society.
On remand, the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared the

Wisconsin adoption procedures unconstitutional, and interpreted Stanley

16b.

to mean:

Id.
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(1) That the denial of a natural father's
parental rights to a child born out of wedlock
based on mere illegitimacy violated his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws,
and (2) that the termination of a natural father's
parental rights to a child born out of wedlock
without actual notice to him, if he was known, or
constructive notice, if unknown, and without giving
him the right to be heard on the termination of
his rights denied him due process of law.-'-'
The Wisconsin Court then declared the adoption void because the
father's rights had not been properly terminated, and indicated
that in the future all natural fathers must be given notice
of adoption proceedings, but left solution of the procedural
problems to the legislature*
Only one (1) month after the Wisconsin Court decided
Rothstein,

the Illinois Supreme Court had occasion to interpret

the effect of its own decision in Stanley
procedures.

In Slawek

v.

Covenant

on Illinois adoption
18
Children9s
Uome>
a child

had been placed for adoption with the consent of the mother
only.

The putative father appealed, arguing that the adoption

agency knew he was the father, and had finalized the adoption
without notice to him and without his consent.

The Illinois

Supreme Court held:

17.

59 Wis.2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826, 828 (1973)

18.

52 111.2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972).
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-17The United States Supreme Court has recently
held that state laws which deny hearing to
determine the fitness of a father for the
custody of his children born out of wedlock
while extending this right to other parents
are based upon an unreasonable distinction
and violate equal protection principles . . .
The Court recognized that the interests of
the father of an illegitimate child are no
different from those of other parents.
The Court then went on to state:
The provisions of the adoption and paternity
acts are unconstitutional insofar as they
are in conflict with Stanley,
Rothstein
and
Vanderlaan,
(284N.E.2d at 292)
Five (5) months after Stanleys

a New York court allowed

a putative father to oppose an adoption proceeding, notwithstanding a statute prohibiting such a contest, noting that
the New York statutes were substantially similar to the Illinois
statutes previously held unconstitutional under the reasoning
19
of Stanley.
In Doe v. Department of Social Services,
the
New York court declared that henceforth the New York adoption
statutes ". . « must be construed [to mean] that the mother's
exclusive or sole consent suffices only where there has been
no formal or unequivocal acknowledgment or recognition of
paternity by the father."

337 N.Y.S.2d at 107,

Implementing the Stanley
Stanley

rule.

Implementation of the

rule in adoption proceedings was immediate in several

jurisdictions.

As a result of Stanley

and Slawek,

the Illinois

Attorney General issued an opinion that consent to an adoption

19.

77 Misc. 2d 666, 337 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
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-18must be obtained from the putative father.

If he refuses

to give his consent, or is unknown, he must be made a party
defendant in the adoption proceedings.
in the Illinois Bar Journal, all

According to an article

unwed fathers must be given
20

notice and an opportunity to be heard at adoption proceedings.
The Washington Attorney General also issued an opinion to the
effect that many of that statefs adoption proceedings were
21
unconstitutional.
Finally, in response to Stanley,
new
adoption statutes were quickly passed in Washington, Wisconsin,
Michigan and Colorado (see APPENDIX).
The current state of the law.

In October, 1972, repre-

sentatives of the American Bar Association and the Child
Welfare League of America met to discuss the implications
of the Stanley

decision for the child welfare field.

As a

result of that conference, the Child Welfare League adopted
the following position:
At the present time there is no unanimity as to
the constitutionally required legal rights of
fathers of children born out of wedlock. There
are those who hold that all known fathers must
be notified as part of any action to terminate
parental rights, whether voluntary or judicial.
Others hold that only fathers who have formally
or informally acknowledged paternity need to
be notified.

20. 61 111. Bar J. 378, 379 (1973), citing
Gen. 542 (1972).

1972 Op. Atty.

21c WASH. OP. ATTY. GEN., Unpublished Memorandum No. 72-227,
Dec. 7, 1972.
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-19The Child Welfare League of America recognizes
that until the legal position is clarified it
would be safer, from a legal standpoint, to
notify all known fathers.22
From these developments, the trend in the law is clear.
Until the parent-child relationship is severed, and the putative father's rights are terminated in a judicial proceeding
in which the father is given the fair hearing required by the
Due Process Clause, unwed fathers may not be treated differently
from other parents under the Equal Protection Clause, and therefore the consent of a putative father who acknowledges paternity
is required before an illegitimate child may be adopted.

Numerous

states have now incorporated this rule into their adoption
statutes (see APPENDIX).
Application to the instant case.

In the present case,

the Respondent father's rights in relation to baby girl H
have not been terminated, either voluntarily or in any judicial
proceeding.

It is undisputed that the Respondent has at all

times publicly acknowledged his paternity.

The rule of con-

stitutional law laid down by the United States Supreme Court
in Stanley

therefore compels affirmance of the ruling of the

trial court in this case that the Respondent's consent to
placement of baby girl H

for adoption is required, unless

his parental rights are terminated as provided by law.

22. Comment, Protecting
the Putative Father's Rights
After
Stanley v. Illinois:
Problems in Implementation^
13 J. Fam. Law
115, 135 & n. 101.
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-20POINT II
UNDER UTAH LAW, THE PUTATIVE FATHER OF AN
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD HAS CUSTODY RIGHTS WHICH CONSTITUTE HIM "A PARENT HAVING RIGHTS IN RELATION TO SAID
CHILD11 FOR PURPOSES OF §78-30-4, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
AS AMENDED (1973 SUPP C ).
In 1970f the Utah Supreme Court decided a case which is
remarkably similar to Stanley*

and is a tribute to the foresight

and wisdom of our Court, inasmuch as it preceded Stanley
by two
23
years. As in Stanley * the Utah decision in In Re M
involved
a custody proceeding rather than an adoption, but also like
Stanleys

that appears to be a distinction without a difference.

In In Re Ms one James Thomas was the natural father of an
illegitimate child.

Three days after its birth, the baby was

removed from the hospital on a warrant issued by the juvenile court
alleging that the child was neglected and dependent, that Thomas
was the putative father, that the mother had expressed a desire
to relinquish custody and was severely emotionally disturbed, and
that therefore the child should be in the care and custody of
the State Department of Public Welfare.

At a hearing on

the petition, Thomas appeared in court and acknowledged his
paternity and requested custody of the child if the mother was
deprived of her parental rights.

Subsequent to the hearing

Thomas filed a separate petition seeking custody and again

23.

25 Utah 2d 101, 476 P.2d 1013 (1970).
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-21acknowledging paternity.

The juvenile court held that Thomas

had "no legal rights to the child11 because he x^as not the "legal"
father, and dismissed the petition.
On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, Thomas contended that
he had "acknowledged" the child in court, and that he therefore
had custodial rights in the child which could not be terminated
without following the same procedures as were applicable to
married fathers.

The Court's decision began with the observation

that this was a case of first impression in Utah.

The Court

then proceeded to a discussion of the ancient fictions of
filius

and filius

populi3

nullius

and noted the common law and statutory

erosion and eventual abandonment of those fictions and the
recognition of rights in both the natural mother and, later,
the natural father:
. . . At about the same time that the mother came
to enjoy joint custody with the father of illegitimate
children, it was commonplace to state that the primary
right to custody of illegitimate children belongs to
the mother and that her right is good against all including the putative father, or, conversely, the father
has a custodial right good against all but the mother.24
The Court then quoted a leading New Jersey case:
Since the father's duty to support and educate
the child is to the same extend as if the child
was born in lawful wedlock, it should follow that
the father's right to custody should be almost coextensive. Thus, while his right is not as great
as that of the mother, it is certainly far greater
than that of a stranger.

24.

476 P.2d at 1015.
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It is clear that the present trend of legal
and popular thinking is that a willing father of
an illegitimate child should have a right to custody
if it is in the best interests of the child, particularly where the mother has abandoned the child,
either actually or constructively by surrendering
the child to an agency for adoption.25
Finally, the Court's holding on the custody rights of an unwed
father in Utah was clear and succinct:
A statutory parent-child relationship has been
established between the publicly acknowledged
child and his putative father that places him
in parity with a legitimate child in rights of
support, education and inheritance.
The putative father of an illegitimate child is
entitled to its custody and control as against
all but the mother, if he is competent to care
for and suitable to take charge of the child
and if it appears that the best interests of
the child will be thereby secured.26
In the present case, it is undisputed that the Respondent
has publicly acknowledged baby girl H _ _ _ as his child.
Further, the child's mother, Appellant JANA HOPE, has relinquished all her rights in and to the child by executing
her written consent to adoption and placing the child for
adoption with Appellant L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES. Hence,
under the rationale of In Re M> the Respondent has a right
to custody of baby girl H _

m

superior to that of any

stranger, including Appellant L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, unless

25. Id. at 1016, citing
In Re Guardianship of C, 98 N.J.
Super. 474, 237 A.2d 652, 657-58 (1967).
26.

476 P.2d at 1017.
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-23his right are terminated by the juvenile courts, after a
proper hearing, on the grounds that he is not a fit and
proper person to have custody of his child.
Custody, however, is not the issue in this proceeding.
Respondent is only seeking a determination that his consent
to any adoption of baby girl H

is required.

In 1966,

the Utah adoption statute was amended to read in pertinent
part:
A child cannot be adopted without the consent of
each living parent having rights in relation to
said . . . . 27
Clearly the unwed father*s right under In Re M to custody
of the child, unless he is proven unfit, is a right possessed
by the parent "in relation to said child" for purposes of the
statute.

The respondent's fitness as a father, and the best

interests of the child, are not at issue in this proceeding
because all issues concerning actual custody have been reserved
for later hearing.

Respondent seeks here only a determination

that he is a "parent having rights in relation to said child,"
and that therefore, baby girl H

cannot be placed for

adoption without his consent unless and until all of his
parental rights have been judicially terminated.
Certainly the unwed father should not be required to
do more to establish his "rights in relation to the child"

27.

§78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, as amended (1973 Supp.).
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-24than was done here.

Indeed, it was physically impossible

to do more.

The Court in In Re M held Thomas had "acknowledged"

baby girl M

by public declaration in Court and in a written,

and presumably verified, petition.

Here, in addition to

acknowledging his paternity under oath by affidavit in this
declaratory judgment action and in testimony in open court,
the Respondent offered to marry the natural mother, support
the child and pay medical expenses associated with its birth,
or take custody of the child himself.
Having thus established his rights in relation to baby
girl H

, to the fullest extent possible, the Respondent

qualifies as a parent whose consent to adoption of the illegitimate child is required.
POINT III
AN UNWED FATHER NEED NOT LEGITIMATE HIS ILLEGITIMATE CHILD IN ORDER TO BE A PARENT WHOSE CONSENT TO
ADOPTION IS REQUIRED UNDER §78-30-4, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
AS AMENDED (1973 SUPF.).
Legitimation unnecessary under Utah law.

The position

that an unwed father must have legitimated his illegitimate
child in order for his consent to be required for adoption of
the child stems from the ^re-Stanley

rule of law to the effect

that such a father is not legally a "parent."

Precisely the

same position was advanced by the Utah Attorney General in
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-25the state's brief and argument in In Re M3 discussed in
POINT II, supraj

where it was asserted that ff[i]n the context

of 78-30-4, the father of an illegitimate child is not a
28
parent/1
The state argued that the illegitimate father
must acquire

parental rights in relation to the child in

order to come within the adoption consent statute (§78-30-4),
either in a judicial proceeding or pursuant to statute.
As did the U.S. Supreme Court in Stanley3

the Utah Supreme

Court rejected the fundamental premise that a father is not
a parent within the contemplation of the law, by its holding
that such a father has an inherent

right to custody second

only to the right of the mother, unless such right is terminated
29
voluntarily or judicially.
Hence, since an unwed father is
already

a "parent having rights in relation to" an illegitimate

child (POINT II, supra);

it is immediately apparent that he

need not legitimize the child in order to establish himself
as one whose consent to an adoption is required under §78-30-4,
Utah Code Annotated, as amended (1973 Supp.).
The Hayes case is consistent with Stanley.

Appellants
30

cite Commonwealth of Virginia,
for its discussion of Stanley.

et al. v. George Hayes,
Jr.3
In Hayes, the trial court

28.

In Re M, BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT (State of Utah) at 8.

29.

476 P.2d at 1018.

'30. 215 Va. 49, 205 S.E.2d 644 (1974), cited in BRIEF OF
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT at 3.
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-26awarded custody of an illegitimate child to its putative father.
The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, but not on the ground
that in all instances legitimation is required in order to
make the illegitimate fatherfs consent necessary to an adoption*
as is suggested by Appellants1 brief.

Instead, the Virginia

Court reversed a gross misinterpretation of Stanley

by the

trial court:
In the present case, the trial judge
apparently was of opinion [sic] that Stanley
compelled
not only a hearing upon the fitness of the putative
father but also the award of custody to the father
upon his demand. This is evident from the judge's
oral opinion. The
judge, after stating that the
father had been flguilty of anti-social,
immoral
and illegal conduct," asked, f,why then is he
entitled to his child?" The judge answered his
own query by saying, with obvious reference to
Stanleys "the supreme court has said he is entitled
to the child [and]
I am going to give the child
11
to the father.
Thus, it is apparent that Stanley
was misinterpreted and consequently misapplied by
the trial court. 205 S.E.2d at 647.
The Virginia Supreme Court's reversal and entry of final judgment
in favor of the proposed adoptive parents was entirely consonant
with the Stanley

due process requirement, because the trial

court had already found that Hayes was clearly an unfit father
and therefore a subsequent hearing on the issue of fitness
was rendered unnecessary.

The Virginia high court noted in

passing that, " . * * in light

presented,

of the factual

situation

here

unless the child is legitimated by the marriage of

her parents [citation omitted] before a petition for her adoption
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-27is filed, the consent of the father to the adoption will be
31
unnecessary."
(Emphasis added.) The court noted in conclusion
that fl. . . whatever may be the application of Stanley,

it is

certain that the decision does not stand for the proposition
that a putative father who is in fact unfit is nonetheless
32
entitled to custody of his child.ff
Thus, on its facts,
Hayes is clearly distinguishable from and inapplicable to the
present case in which there has been no prior judicial determination that Respondent is an unfit parent, or any other
termination of his parental rights in relation to baby girl
H

.
The Irby

line of cases is not applicable.

also cite the Irby

line of California cases

Appellants

for this notion

that an illegitimate child must be legitimated before the
consent of the unwed father will be required to an adoption
of the child.
case.

Yet these cases are inapplicable in the present

First, the Irby

line of cases involved a California

consent statute, similar to the pre-1966 Utah statute, which
specifically omits the illegitimate father from the list of

31.
32.

205 S.E.2d at 647.

^

Id.

33. In Re Adoption of Irby, 226 Cal. App. 2d 238, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 879 (1964); Truschke v. LaRocca, 237 Cal. App. 2d 75, 46
Cal. Rptr. 601 (1965); In Re Adoption of Pierce, 15 Cal. App. 3d
244, 93 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1971).
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-2834
persons whose consent is required to an adoption.
under the California statute3

Hence,

an illegitimate father must

become a ''legitimate11 father (by legitimizing the child) in
order to bring himself within the class of persons whose consent to adoption is required.

Since the Utah Legislature

has specifically rewritten Utah's consent statute to eliminate
distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate parents,
this case must be decided under the amended language of our
present statute, as discussed in POINT II,
Moreover, the Irby

supra.

line of cases relied upon by Appellants

was decided prior to Stanleys

and hence did not take into

account the illegitimate father's now-recognized constitu35
tional rights.

A recent California adoption decision

cusses Stanley,

and, taking note of the Rothstein

decisions applying Stanley

and

disSlawek

to adoptions, suggests that

California law may soon fall into line with those decisions:
. , c Stanley
suggests the possibility of
further development in California law relating
to paternal rights in illegitimate children,
not only because of the opinion's emphasis on
the "essential11 right of a father to raise and

34.

California Civil Code, §224 provides in pertinent part:
A legitimate child cannot be adopted without the
consent of its parents if living; . . . nor an
illegitimate child without the consent of its
mother if living; . . .

35. Cheryl Lynn H. v. Superior Court for the County of
Los Angeles, 41 Cal. App. 3d 273, 115 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1974).
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-29his "cognizable and substantial11 interest in
retaining their custody [citations omitted],
but also because of its strong implication
that an illegitimate father who has never had
custody of his child, is entitled, like other
parents, to notice and hearing of any proceeding which might bring about a change in legal
custody of the child*^6
Stanley

recognized constitutional rights which cannot

be contingent on another person's good will.

Most of the

cases relied upon by Appellants in this proceeding were
decided prior to Stanley3

and therefore did not recognize

constitutional rights in the putative father of an illegitimate
child.

Appellants' POINT III, "A CHILD CANNOT BE LEGITIMATED

WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF ITS MOTHER," is unsupportable in light
of Stanley.

By asserting that the child must be legitimated

to make the putative father's consent to adoption necessary,
Appellants seek to make it more difficult for an unwed father
to obtain standing to assert the "essential" constitutional
rights recognized in Stanley.

By further proposing that the

unwed mother may, at her discretion, bar legitimation by the
father, Appellants seek to make it impossible

for the father

to obtain standing, thereby effectively divesting him of the
"essential" constitutional rights of Due Process and Equal
Protection recognized in Stanley.

Surely an individual in

this country may not be divested of rights of
stature at the whim of another individual.

36.

constitutional

Such a holding

115 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
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-30would vitiate Stanleys

along with most of the great strides

forward in recent years by the United States Supreme Court
in the areas of civil rights and equal protection.
the recognition of constitutional
father in Stanleys

Following

rights in the putative

earlier decisions, such as those relied

upon by Appellants here, can no longer be viewed as controlling,
to the extent that they would abrogate such constitutional
rights.
POINT IV
IF UTAH'S ADOPTION STATUTE IS NOT INTERPRETED
TO REQUIRE THE NATURAL FATHER'S CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION
OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD, THEN THE STATUTE MUST BE FOUND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN LIGHT OF STANLEY v.

ILLINOIS.

If the finding of the trial court is reversed, and it is
found that under Utah law, even where the unwed father has
openly and formally acknowledged his paternity, his consent to
the adoption of his illegitimate child is not required, then
the Utah statute, §78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, as amended
(1973 Suppo), must be found unconstitutional under the holding
and reasoning in Stanley

v.

Illinois^

Under Stanley*

the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that an unwed
father be afforded a fair hearing before his parental rights
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-31(such as the custody right established under Utah law in In Re M)
can be terminated.

Further, such a father is denied the consti-

tutionally guaranteed Equal Protection under the law if his consent
to an adoption is not required under the same circumstances in
which the consent of an unwed mother, or a married father or
mother, would be required*
As discussed in POINT I, supra*

there is clear precedent

for a finding that a state adoption statute is unconstitutional
under Stanley.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court made such a finding

in Rothstein*

and in Slawek

decided Stanley

the Illinois Supreme Court which

overturned that state1s adoption and paternity

statutes to the extent that they conflicted with

Stanley.

CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that the Respondent is in fact the father
of baby girl H

, and that he has at all times publicly

acknowledged his paternity.

Respondent has done all that he

possibly could to assume his parental duties and legitimate
the child.

He offered to marry the child's natural mother,

Appellant JANA HOPE, but was refused.

He offered to pay the

medical bills occasioned by the pregnancy and birth, and
offered to take the child into his home, but Appellant L.D.S.
SOCIAL SERVICES refused to even disclose the whereabouts of
the child, and secretly placed the child with prospective adoptive
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-32parents without Respondent's knowledge or consent.
under these facts, and the holdings in Stanley

Clearly,

v.

Illinois

and In Re M3 Respondent is a "living parent having rights in
relation to [the] child" within the purview of Utah's adoption
consent statute, §78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, as amended
(1973 Supp.).

A contrary ruling would deprive Respondent of

the essential constitutional guarantees of Due Process and
Equal Protection recognized in Stanley,

Respondent therefore

respectfully urges affirmance of the trial court's determination in this declaratory judgment action.
Respectfully submitted,

JL (A
HAROLD A. HINT2E for
STRONG, POELMAN & FOX
2000 The Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Served two (2) copies of the foregoing
Brief on Appellants by delivering them
to F. Briton McConkie at 336 South
Third East, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
/•7tU day of June, 1975.
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APPENDIX
The putative father's consent is required for the termination of his parental rights and adoption of his illegitimate child in the following states:
ALABAMA:

If the father has established his paternity.
Ala. Code tit. 27, §3 (1958).

ARIZONA:

If the putative father has established parentage.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §8-103 (Supp. 1972).

ARKANSAS:

If the father has established his paternity.
Ark. Stat. Ann. §56-106 (1971).

COLORADO:

If, prior to the adoption decree, the father
has acknowledged the child as his own. Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§22-1-3, 22-4-1 (Supp. 1974).

CONNECTICUT:

Unless the putative father has been given
notice and his parental rights terminated.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §45-61i(b)(2) (Supp.
1974).

DELAWARE:

Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, §908(2)(a)

FLORIDA:

Unless the mother of the child does not know
the father's identity, and a reasonable search
would not reveal his identity. Fla. Stat. Ann.
§63.062(l)(b) (Supp. 1974).

INDIANA:

If the father has established paternity, supported
the child, and the court has his address or
can located him without an expenditure exceeding five dollars. Ind. Ann. Stat. §3-120 (Supp.
1972).

IOWA:

Consent is required of the parent "having the
care and providing for the wants of the child."
Iowa Code Ann. §600.3 (Supp. 1973).

KENTUCKY:

If the paternity is established in a legal
action, or if an affidavit is filed stating
that the affiant is the father of the child.
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §199.500 (Supp. 1974).
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LOUISIANA:

If the child has been formally acknowledged
or legitimated by the father. La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §9:404 (1965).

MAINE:

Upon the filing of an affidavit by the child's
mother, the judge will make a factual determination, and decide whether it is necessary to require that the father be given notice and 20
days in which to petition for custody of the
child. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, §532
(Supp. 1974).

MICHIGAN:

If the unwed father has filed notice of intent
to claim paternity. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§710.3a (Supp. 1973).

MINNESOTA:

The statute does not require consent from the
putative father of an illegitimate child.
Minn. Stat. Ann. §259.24 (1971). The case law,
however, is contra:
In ve Shady, 118 N.W.2d
449 (Minn. 1962). The putative father who
promptly acknowledges paternity and expresses
interest in his child is entitled to notice
and hearing of all proceedings. In ve Brennan,
134N.W.2dl26 (Minn. 1965).

NEVADA:

If the unwed father has established his parental
rights in the proper court. Nev. Rev. Stat.
§127.040 (1967).

NEW MEXICO:

If the child is established to be the putative
father's child by his acknowledgment or by a
court proceeding, or if the father adopts the
child. N. M. Stat. Ann. §22-2-25 (Supp. 1973).

OKLAHOMA:

If the father's paternity is formally established.
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §60.5 (1966).

RHODE ISLAND:

R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. §15-7-5

SOUTH DAKOTA:

S. D. Compiled Laws Ann. §25-6-4

TEXAS:

There must be a decree terminating the parentchild relationship as to each living parent
of the illegitimate child before any petition
for adoption of the child may be considered.
Vern. Tex. Codes Ann., Family Code, §16.03(b)
(Supp. 1974).

(Supp. 1972).
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UTAH:

Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4

VIRGINIA:

Unless the putative father's identity is not
reasonably ascertainable, or he is given notice
by mail to last known address and fails to
object within 21 days. Va. Code Ann. §63.1-225
(Supp. 1974).

WASHINGTON:

Consent is required of both parents, unless
they have been given notice and have not contested the adoption prior to entry of the
interlocutory decree of adoption. Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. §§26.32.30, 26.32.40 (Supp. 1974).

(Supp. 1973).
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